• So, the personality theory of personal identity can be accepted by physicalists, and it can be accepted by dualists.

    因此人格同一性的人格论,既可以被物理主义学者接受,也可以被二元论者接受。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • Let's take a few minutes and consider the nature of the body theory, the body theory of personal identity.

    我们先来探讨,人格同一性的肉体论的,基本性质。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • As he writes, The Astonishing Hypothesis is that: You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.

    正如他在其著作《惊人的假说》中写到,你,你的喜悦,悲伤,回忆,抱负,你对人格同一性的感知,你的自由意志,事实上,这一切都不过,是大量神经细胞集,与其缔合分子的生理反应而已

    耶鲁公开课 - 心理学导论课程节选

  • And particular, how should we run that if we think about the body as the key ? to personal identity?

    特别是,当我们认为肉体是,人格同一性的关键时,对此我们又如何解释?

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • For me, the choice boils down to the choice between the body theory of personal identity and personality theory of personal identity.

    在我看来,选择范围就缩小到了,人格同一性的肉体论,和人格同一性的人格论上。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And having the very same body is the key to to personal identity. It's not the same person.

    而拥有同样肉体才是人格同一性的,关键,现在的并非原来那个人。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And we need to get clear on the nature of identity or persistence or, more specifically, personal identity.

    同时还要弄清同一性及,持存的本质,具体说来就是,个人同一性

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • So, for example, we'll spend whatever it is, maybe a week and a half talking about the nature of personal identity, two weeks.

    所以,举个例子来说,我们无论花什么,也许一个半星期会谈论,个人身份的本质,二个星期。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And if the body theory of personal identity " is right, "Well, that would be me."

    如果人格同一性的肉体论,是正确的,“那么,那个人就是我“

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • So body is the key to personal identity, we don't have to worry about the fact that we are constantly gaining and losing items.

    因此肉体是人格同一性的关键,不必担心,肉体不停地新增或失去什么微粒。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And particularly as probable as we were mentioning, that early Christians believed in something like the body theory of personal identity and believed in bodily resurrection.

    尤其是我们刚刚,提到的那种可能,早期的基督教徒相信,人格同一性的肉体论,相信肉体复活。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And that mistake might mislead us if we start thinking the personal identity case.

    如果考虑人格同一性的问题,这个错误可能会误导我们。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And yet for all that dualists could consistently say, still same soul as not the key to personal identity, same personality is the key to personal identity.

    所有的二元论者都可以坚持认为,同样的灵魂并非,人格同一性的关键,同样的人格,才是人格同一性的关键。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And so when the personality theorist says the key to personal identity is the same personality. They don't mean literally the very same set of believes and desires.

    所以当人格论专家说道,人格同一性的关键在于,同样的人格时,他们指的不是,一成不变的一系列信仰和渴望。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • So I'm gonna spend some time talking about examples that I think we would not find puzzling and walk our way back up to the case of personal identity.

    我将会花点时间讲解,举一些大家不会感到疑惑的例子,不要让大家重新掉入,人格同一性的问题。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And suppose that souls are the key to personal identity.

    假设灵魂是个人认同感的关键。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And suppose the soul is the key to personal identity.

    假设灵魂就是个人认同感的关键。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And if the knucklebone theory of personal identity gets proposed and somebody said, Oh,yes,but you see,that person now with that knucklebone will be you, because the key to personal identity is having the very same knucklebone.

    如果个人认同感的指关节骨理论被提出,有人会说,你看,这个有着你指关节骨的人,就会成为你,因为指关节骨就是个人认同感的关键。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • If only you had seen the light and stuck to the soul theory of personal identity, all these problems could be avoided.

    如果你们能够领悟真谛,接受灵魂理论,这些麻烦就自然消失了。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • Pretty clearly, to think about death and continued existence and survival, we have to get clear about the nature of personal identity.

    很清楚,要想思考死亡,和继续存在并且活着,我们不得不弄清楚个人身份的本质。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • As you know from reading your Pairy, the sigh reading has dialogue on personal identity and immortality.

    读,野狼战北,这本书,里面提到过关于人格同一性,和永生不死的对话。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • If I were to discover that's what was happening metaphysically and the soul view was the true theory of personal identity, I'd say,Huh!

    如果这就是形而上学地发生的事情,而且灵魂观点是个人认同感的正确理论,我会说!

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And personality theory, key to be-- key to personal identity is having the very same personality.

    人格论-,人格同一性的关键在于,同样的人格。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And let's just suppose the correct theory of personal identity is Van Inwagen such as to put aside any worries we might have along with van Inwagen, that we discussed previously, as to whether or not on resurrection day that would really be you or not. Suppose it would be you.

    假设正确的个人认同感理论是这样的,例如将之前讨论,理论时的种种担忧放在一边,也就是审判日当天,到底是不是真的你,我们假设就是你。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

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